

*Two Regions Divided by a Common Language:
The Growth of Regional-Nationalist Movements in Catalonia and Valencia*

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Introduction

Despite the fact that Europe is the birthplace of the nation-state, sub-national movements for greater autonomy from the state thrive within many regions throughout the continent. Many of these movements exist in Spain, most notably in the Basque and Catalanian regions. The goal of this study is to explain the emergence and development of successful regional movements using field research conducted in Catalonia and Valencia, two regions in eastern Spain. Despite their striking similarities (language, culture, and religion), Catalonia has had a coherent, powerful regional movement, while Valencia's movements have been considerably weaker.

More specifically, we explore how the economic differences between the two regions have affected the emergence and varying strengths of their regional movements. This study underscores the critical importance of local economic and political elites in mobilizing movements for regional autonomy that can sustain themselves. First, we review the literature and describe our theoretical model developed for the purpose of explaining the development of regional movements. The next sections attempt to apply this model to the Catalanian and Valencian cases. Our paper concludes with findings from this regional comparison.

Review of the Literature

The following section briefly outlines key academic theories that relate to the rise of regional movements. Scholars consistently stress the importance of key factors such as the strength of regional identity, degree of regional autonomy, use of native language, and influence of elite actors. Furthermore, they emphasize the relationship between these

factors and the region's historical background and geographical location. The academic arguments relating to these regional characteristics and the geo-historical context in which they are embedded are briefly summarized below.

Collective Action and Creating a Successful Regional Movement

One theory of regional movements views them through the lens of collective action. Nielsen and Salk (1998) conclude that strength of sub-national identification and regional autonomy have a positive relationship with the creation of an EU regional office in Brussels, evidence of collective action.¹ These variables were more significant than variables more often associated with collective action, such as the size and prosperity of the regions. The authors also emphasize the context within which these regional characteristics are found, stating that the two factors “are clearly the result of the idiosyncratic historical developments that have led to the cultural and political position of a region within the larger national entity to which it belongs” (Nielsen and Salk, 1998: 248).

Language and Regional Identity

A common language fosters a sense of group membership and promotes loyalty to that group, which in turn contributes to a distinct regional identity (Shabad and Gunther, 1982: 453; McMillion, 1981: 306). In Catalonia the language is a particularly fundamental feature of regional nationalism (Shabad and Gunther, 1982: 446; McMillion, 1981: 305; Rees, 1996: 319). Language also influences other factors such as the degree of autonomy from the central government and the amount of support regional-nationalist political elites enjoy (Shabad and Gunther, 1982: 444).


The Catalan language became even more important during the Franco dictatorship, when it was repressed along with other Catalonian culture in an attempt to create a single Spanish identity (Rees, 1996: 314). Huge signs were erected instructing the citizens to “Speak the language of the Empire!” (Payne, 1971: 49-50). Following the death of Franco, the regional government aggressively promoted Catalan, most notably in the form of native language education in schools (McMillion, 1981: 305; Ferrer, 2000). This type of education is positively correlated with support for nationalist movements (Gorenburg, 2001).

Elite Actors and Regional Movements

Finally, scholarly work shows that political, cultural, and intellectual elites play key organizational roles in promoting cultural understanding, solidifying identity, and galvanizing regional movements (Gorenburg, 2001: 73). The decisions of these elites can be the difference between a violent movement and a non-violent one, as Edles (1999) argues in a comparison between Basque and Catalonian nationalism. It is in the elites’ interest to play this role for both political and economic reasons. Focusing on regional issues has always been popular with voters, particularly among the Catalonians (Coverdale, 1997: 622). In addition, elites have an incentive to support regional movements since increased autonomy is often in their best economic interests. As McMillion (1981: 292) states, “Regionalists...tend to emphasize the economic inefficiency of an administrative apparatus whose major defining characteristic is that it has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.”

The Model

Our goal is to explain how and why successful regional-nationalist movements exist in some regions and not others. We argue that it is only when a very specific set of circumstances exist can regional-nationalist movements form and grow. The following section of our paper enumerates these factors and explains the links between them, tracing the causal path from the independent variables to our dependent variable, successful regional-nationalist movements.



The Dependent Variable: Regional-Nationalist Movements

A regional-nationalist movement, or RNM, is a movement of sustained political activism and mobilization around a territorially and culturally defined identity that is distinct from the dominant identity of the state. RNMs are comprised of social and political institutions that support the regionally defined identity, and pursue goals associated with the continuation or encouragement of that identity. This often includes increased political and economic autonomy from the central government of the state, and in extreme examples, regional-nationalist movements may call for the formation of a new state.

Economic Interests, Political Strategy, and Alternative Identity

The causal path leading to the emergence of an RNM can be loosely divided into three steps; initial conditions, the growth of the regional-nationalist identity, and the emergence of an RNM built around that identity. A number of these conditions are mainly created by historical happenstance; therefore we do not attempt to explain their causes. These can generally be classified as initial conditions, though the degree of wealth and resources is discussed in the section on the growth of a movement due to its distinct relationship with successful regional governance. The other steps along the causal path are dependent upon the initial conditions, though there are a considerable number of reinforcing conditions that our model addresses.

Initial Conditions

For a RNM to develop, there must be an initial seed of an alternative identity to the dominant identity of the state. Many regions lack this condition; for example, Madrid is mostly Castilian (the dominant cultural identity and language of Spain) and is therefore

unlikely to develop a RNM even if it possesses the other characteristics necessary and has a strong local identity.

There also must be economic or political elites with an opportunity to use the alternative identity for their own interests. The regional identity (as opposed to the dominant state identity) can be co-opted by elites in order to mobilize the population of the region. Without the resources and organization of elites, a strong movement is unlikely to arise.

Growth of a Political and Social Identity

There are two dominant aspects of a regional-nationalist identity – the cultural aspect and the political aspect. Each individually generates some identification with a regional population, but neither alone is sufficient to function as the centerpiece of an RNM.

The cultural aspect of identity grows primarily out of the initial seeds of an alternative identity. Rather than being a result of political mobilization, it is shaped over time by intellectuals and other elites, with manifestations in language, art, music, food, and other cultural traits. These aspects are the ones most commonly associated with identity, but they are not sufficient for a meaningful *political* identity to be formed. Instead, they are the building blocks for a political identity, and are used to differentiate one “people” from another.

Central to the political aspect of regional identity is territory – the specific geographic area that the population includes in its collective identity. Unlike in the cultural aspect, political mobilization of the populace around an alternative identity by the actors with significant economic interests in autonomy plays a central role in the

development of a political identity. The cultural side of identity often comes first, and is subsequently used as a tool to create a more politically practical side of identity based on territory. Political mobilization around cultural traits introduces political aspects such as territorial distinctness and strengthens regional identity. This, in turn, results in more effective mobilization. Once the process is begun, it can quickly become self-reinforcing.

From Identity to Movement

As regional identity becomes stronger it becomes more effective as a political strategy. The process begun by economic elites with an interest in autonomy continues and grows stronger in the political sphere, particularly with the introduction of geographic and other pragmatic aspects of identity. As regional-nationalist mobilization continues and becomes more regular and politically successful at a regional level, the political identity becomes embedded in the political and social make-up of the region, evolving into a long lasting movement built around regional-nationalist identity – an RNM.

Making It Last: Regional Government and Wealth

For an RNM to survive over time, it needs to operate within a regional political infrastructure. Governments – particularly democratic ones – retain legitimacy and instill loyalty by creating successful policy. If the populace believes that resources and improvements are coming from the regional government, they will increasingly associate themselves with that government, rather than with central or supra-national levels of government. Therefore, the success and survival of an RNM depends on political institutions that allow it to affect policy regionally and legitimate its calls for increased

autonomy, as well as on the success of those policies regionally. We argue that regions with more resources available to them are more likely to house RNMs. For a political movement to survive within the regional political institutions, it must offer benefits to its constituents, which is more difficult when resources themselves are scarce.

Governance and Identity: A Reinforcing Path Through the RNM

The more successful politically an RNM is, the more regional identity will be used as a tool for mobilization. As mentioned earlier, a strong and successful regional government that is supported by an RNM will reinforce that support for the RNM and, by extension, further cement the regional identity. Furthermore, a strong regional identity strengthens the RNM, which then uses its influence to strengthen the regional government and push economic policies specifically geared towards the region. In general, policy made at a regional level is better for the region than policy that originates at other levels, so a strong RNM can increase the likelihood of successful policy being enacted in the area. This completes the circle; successful regional governance strengthens the RNM, which in turn strengthens the regional identity, which also reinforces the RNM, and thereby benefits the regional government.

Resources and Governance: The Success of Devolution

In general, regional governments are better for their regions than central ones. This is partly because they enact policies that are specifically geared towards the area and are based on more in-depth knowledge of the region, whereas central governments tend to gear policy statewide and have less expertise in any given region. In addition to this, strong regional governments are better able to compete with other levels of government, as well as other regions, for resources; regional governments are then more able to

support their regional policies. Successful regional governance improves the well-being of the region and increases the amount of resources available for taxation, which strengthens the regional government's ability to support its policies, increasing the likelihood of successful policy-making.

Testing the Model: The Cases of Catalonia and Valencia

For our cases we selected two neighboring regions in Spain that share many characteristics, Catalonia and Valencia. The two regions have similar cultural roots, but have had remarkably different experiences with identity and regionalism over the last century. In Catalonia, there is a deep sense of regional identity, and the regional-nationalist movement that exists there has been long-lived; it is very politically active and influential. In contrast, the Valencia case has multiple competing identities and movements, and the political, cultural, and economic development of the region has been less coherent and more complex than in Catalonia. By analyzing these cases, we hope to test our model and explore the interconnectedness of regional-nationalist identity and economic change.

Case One – Catalonia: We'd Like to Keep Our Money, Thank You!

History

Catalonia, with its capital of Barcelona, is one of Europe's cultural and business centers. Its cultural uniqueness and distinct regional identity come from a rich historic background dating back to the re-conquest of Spain under the Crown of Aragon. With the reunification of Spain, Catalonian culture developed separately from that of the dominant Spanish culture. Most significantly, the inhabitants of Catalonia speak Catalan,

a language that is similar to Castilian Spanish but distinct enough to form the core of the Catalanian identity (Colomé, 2005).

In the early 19th century, Barcelona became the first city in Spain to industrialize, focusing on mining, shipbuilding, and steel and iron works. This heavy concentration of industry made Catalonia one of the most prosperous and economically developed regions in Spain. As a result of this industrialization, a significant industrial elite class formed that had an interest in promoting political independence from Madrid. Capitalizing on the successful economic development of the region, these elites began to mobilize the general public by appealing to a common Catalanian identity (Castelló, 2005).

An important landmark came in the early 20th century, when, in 1932, Catalonia became an autonomous state under the first Spanish republic.² However, this autonomy only lasted for a few years until the Spanish Civil War, when Francisco Franco came to power in 1936. In his attempts to create a more centralized state, Franco repressed all forms of alternative identity including the Catalanian identity. This was done in part by banning all uses of the Catalan language and by not allowing any political parties (Shabad and Gunther, 1982: 443).

In addition, Franco relocated many southern Spaniards to Catalonia in an attempt to dilute the regional identity. However, the Catalanian elites were able to use the new immigrants' dislike for Franco in order to co-opt them into the Catalanian movement. Many of the children of these immigrants learned Catalan and became some of the strongest supporters of the regional movement (Castelló, 2005; Munoz, 2005).

When Spain returned to democracy after Franco's death in 1975, the Catalonians were able to reclaim much of the autonomy lost during the dictatorship. The Spanish

Constitution of 1978 gave Catalonia full autonomous powers, including control over taxation, education, health care, the police force, and the television and radio stations. Catalanian political parties quickly re-entered Spain's political scene as well. Since the transition to democracy, the regionalist party *Convergència y Unió* (CiU) has been a major player on both the regional and national levels.³ While the CiU has declined in recent years, the overall support for regional parties has not; *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, a more left-wing regional party, has picked up many of the CiU's lost voters (Dellunde, 2005).

During this period, the economy of Catalonia continued to flourish, maintaining Catalonia's status as one of the richest regions in Spain. This economic success provided the regional government with vast resources to distribute, leaving many Catalonians with the impression that their regional government, not the national government in Madrid, was responsible for their economic success (Castelló, 2005).

Catalonia's regional identity was strengthened not only by economic factors, but also by social ones. All students are taught some Catalan in schools, and most parents choose to have Catalan used as a significant part of their children's education. Due to the heavily linguistic nature of Catalanian identity, this socialization strengthened the regional movement as well as the underlying regional identity (Munoz, 2005).

Catalonia's adversarial relationship with the central government played a large role in the RNM. One of the most contentious points is the pan-Catalan movement supported by many in the region. This movement endorses complete independence for "Los Países Catalanes," composed of Catalonia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands, and parts of southern

France (Roig, 2005). However, such regional independence has negative repercussions for Spain, as it would then lose a large chunk of its GDP and two of its major port cities.

Theory

The historical development of the Catalonian regional movement in the past 25 years closely fits our model of an RNM. The initial conditions of an alternative identity and an elite class utilizing this identity as a political tool were strongly present. This mobilization led to a powerful political movement, which included successful regional governance, increased autonomy, and a vibrant regional economy.

In Catalonia, the existence of a distinct alternative identity developed in opposition to the dominant Castilian identity. Additionally, the Catalonian elites had a strong interest in organizing and harnessing this opposition to fight for more autonomy. These two initial conditions combined with the third, a political strategy to mobilize based on the alternative identity, to form a solid foundation for the development of a future RNM. Regional parties in Catalonia attained autonomy for the region during the few Republican years in the early 20th century, illustrating the success of these three initial conditions in encouraging the growth of a strong Catalonian identity and movement.

Starting from the status of an autonomous region in the early 20th century, Catalonia easily facilitated the deepening of a territorially-based regional identity. Franco seriously threatened this identity, but was not able to eliminate it. Barcelona supported the Republicans and was heavily oppressed during the fascist regime, yet the Catalonian identity persevered. The economic elites opposed the Franquist regime, as it aimed to centralize political and economic power at the expense of regional autonomy (Munoz, 2005). The revival of the Catalonian identity after the death of Franco illustrated the

saliency of the regional identity and paved the way for the success of the RNM in Catalonia.

The final stage of our model entails the actual development of an RNM. In this case, the RNM manifested in regional political parties that successfully fought for autonomy from the central government. The success of these regional political parties that ran on nationalist platforms, particularly the CiU, exemplifies the enduring strength of the Catalan identity. As the Catalan regional government solidified its hold over regional politics, the economic resources in the region became part of the political strategy, used by the regional government as a tool to perpetuate the growth of the regional identity. The CiU had political resources to implement services that benefited Catalan society; Catalan citizens responded by further supporting their regional government and thus the Catalan RNM (Pallares, 2005).

In sum, the Catalan regional identity fits our model. The anti-Castilian (or pro-Catalan) alternative identity, the elites with economic interests in increased regional autonomy, and the political strategy to mobilize the alternative identity all existed as initial conditions within the region. These conditions served to facilitate the growth of the Catalan regional identity, even in the face of extreme opposition from the fascist Franquist regime. Finally, with the growth of the regional identity, the successful regional government utilized the available resources and transformed the Catalan regional identity into a thriving regional-nationalist movement.

Case Two – Valencia: Two Movements Divided by a Common Region?

History

Valencia enjoyed various degrees of political autonomy since it became an autonomous kingdom under the Crown of Aragon in 1238. During the Spanish civil war of the 1930s, Valencia was a Republican stronghold, becoming their capital after the Fascists captured Madrid. While Franco was in power, he repressed the Valencians in a manner similar to the Catalonians, banning the use of their language and forcing immigration into the region in an attempt to dilute their regional identity.

The reaction to this repression, however, was significantly different than the reaction in Catalonia. Both regions preserved their languages; however, the Catalonian elites managed to integrate immigrants into their regional movement, while the less powerful Valencian elites were not able to do the same (Munoz, 2005). We argue that this is largely due to the economic differences between the regions.

The Valencian economy was significantly more agrarian than that of Catalonia. Most of the non-agrarian economy consisted of small, traditional firms with a focus on the local level. Valencian industrialization came earlier than in many parts of Spain, but significantly later than in Catalonia. In addition, due to the predominance of small-firms in the Valencian economy (Montero, 2002: 190), industrialization took place on a more local level (Soler, 2005). As a result, Valencia lacked a well-formed industrialized elite class to lead a regionalist movement during both the dictatorship and post-Franco democracy (Álvarez-Coque, 2005).

Despite this, two significant regionally-oriented movements in Valencia emerged after the Franquist regime. While they existed in the same place and at the same time, the

two movements were based on two distinct alternative identities, were led by different groups of elites, and had different political manifestations. The first, the anti-Catalan movement, was led by Madrid elites. The second, which we are calling “the Valencian movement,”⁴ was largely supported by the relatively weak “petty bourgeois” class in Valencia (Morera, 2005).

The political manifestations of these movements were less clear-cut than in the Catalan case. The anti-Catalan movement, led by the PSOE and the PP in Madrid, created no uniquely Valencian parties. According to some, particularly Catalonians, this relationship gave Valencia preferential treatment from Madrid, though many Valencians question whether or not there was any actual economic benefit to this relationship (Soler, 2005).

The Bloc Nacionalista Valencia (BNV), a centrist party focused on regional issues, was the main political manifestation of the Valencian movement. While neither a player on the national level nor a dominant player on the regional level like the CiU, the BNV still managed to attain increased economic autonomy and official recognition of the Valencian language. While the BNV is currently losing electoral support on the national level, which might suggest a weakening of Valencian identity, opinion polls actually show an increase in the number of Valencians who feel more Valencian than Spanish (Castelló, 2005). It is not clear how this apparent contradiction will be reconciled in the near future (Morera, 2005).

The future of the Valencian economy is similarly unclear. While some see it as a rapidly developing region that may soon rival Catalonia, others worry about its excessive reliance on tourism and the service sector (Soler, 2005). A common complaint is that the

Madrid ruling elite wants Valencia to be its version of Florida, dependent on low-cost tourism. Valencian leaders, however, want to combine efficient agriculture and high-tech industry to tourism and thus be more like California (Morera, 2005). Regardless of which model prevails, Valencia is currently at a crucial moment in its history.

Theory: The Anti-Catalan Movement

The pan-Catalan movement discussed in the previous case study also significantly impacted Valencian regionalism. Many Valencians felt threatened by this movement and reacted negatively towards any move to unify the two regions. This fear eventually evolved into a regional movement, heavily supported by the Madrid economic and political elites, and commonly referred to as the anti-Catalan movement (Colomé, 2005).

Part of this movement came from the potential threat of a Catalonian nation encompassing Valencia. Thus, in this case, the alternative identity was in opposition to Catalonia, not the dominant state identity. While this does not fit perfectly with our model, the notion of a less powerful player forming an identity in opposition to a more powerful player is still present.

Madrid greatly exaggerated this fear, as politicians supporting a stronger central government often used this rhetoric by portraying the Catalonians as a dangerous, imperialist nation. In addition, Valencian elites received incentives from Madrid to emphasize their unique, non-Catalan identity.⁵ Some of these actions were simply a part of the Madrid-Catalonia rivalry, but Madrid also intended to prevent a potential alliance between Catalonia and Valencia (Roig, 2005).

In our model, this translated to a strong presence of two initial conditions: an alternative identity and elites with a strong interest in emphasizing that identity. As a

result, a strong political mobilization against Catalonia developed and persists to this day. The negative reaction to policy perceived as pro-Catalan became a powerful political tool in Valencia for the entire democratic era (Roig, 2005).

Since this movement was orchestrated largely by political elites in Madrid, the transition to democracy did not create regional political parties. Instead, it was reflected in the political strategy of the major parties (PSOE, PP) to convince the Valencians that they needed Madrid to protect them against their imperialist neighbors, and that they were receiving preferential treatment from Madrid (Morera, 2005).

Whether or not this treatment actually occurred was a subject of considerable disagreement in our interviews. Those who believe that Valencia truly did receive extra help from Madrid often point to the development of the Valencian port and the construction of a toll-free highway connecting Madrid with the Valencian capital (Colomé, 2005). However, others point out that while it has been below the Spanish average in GDP per capita for the past 30 years, Valencia still received a negative balance of payments with the central government (Soler, 2005).

Regardless, the reinforcing cycle of successful regional governance and increasing support for the regional government did not exist in Valencia. However, a similar albeit weaker cycle can be found in the Valencian support of the national parties. Valencians perceived that they were benefiting from a close relationship with Madrid, causing them to increase support for whichever national party was in power. Political support garnered by the perception of favorable policies may have increased the incentive for the national parties to perpetuate the notion of favoritism towards Valencia. Thus, an analogous reinforcing cycle existed, but it was much weaker than in the Catalanian case.

The end result is that the anti-Catalan movement can be viewed as an RNM, albeit a significantly weaker one than the Catalanian movement itself. While the initial conditions were very strong, the later stages of the model were significantly weaker, as there was no pragmatic element of increased regional autonomy. Consequently, the movement has been slowly diminishing over the past twenty years.

Theory: The Valencian Movement

Leaders of the Valencian movement assert their identity as uniquely “Valencian,” emphasizing cultural distinction from the rest of Spain and different political interests from Catalonia. However, it is a more pragmatic movement—neither strongly anti-Catalan nor anti-Castilian. Its leaders advocate greater regional autonomy on the grounds that this will promote greater prosperity in the region (Castelló, 2005).

However, this movement has never reached the influence of the Catalanian RNM. We argue that this is largely due to inherent weakness in the initial conditions of the Valencian movement laid out in our model. The alternative identity, which is supplementary to Spanish identity and not necessarily in conflict with it, lacks the anti-Madrid urgency of the Catalanian movement.

Perhaps the most significant shortcoming of the Valencian movement case derives from the region’s lack of a strong economic and independent elite class resulting from the late and localized industrialization. Without sufficient elites to fund and organize the movement, the Valencian movement has not gained tremendous momentum and will probably never catch up to its Catalanian counterpart (Castelló, 2005).

Despite the fact that our model portrays the initial conditions—economic interests and alternative identity—as relatively weak in this second Valencian case, leaders of the

pro-Valencian movement managed to mobilize voters based on a more pragmatic political agenda. While the Valencian identity consists largely of elements from both the Catalanian and Spanish identities, the movement's leaders strategically emphasized the linguistic and territorial differences that distinguish them from the rest of Spain. Ultimately, their main argument defends the notion that only a more autonomous Valencian government could secure its citizens' particular economic and political interests. In other words, they try to convince Valencians to care as much about the prosperity of Valencia as the economic and political success of Spain as a whole (Álvarez-Coque, 2005).

Although Valencia received greater autonomous powers from the Spanish Constitution created in 1978, the Pro-Valencia RNM has since enjoyed small amounts of success in generating greater autonomous powers over the economy, language, and media (Morera, 2005). However, Valencia lacks a strong regional government with the power to distribute resources and be involved in the decision-making process, due in part from weak initial conditions necessary for fueling public sentiments for autonomy. Without the presence of a stronger regional government, citizens continue to attribute economic and political successes and failures to the central Spanish government.

Conclusions

The cases of Catalonia and Valencia support our model and illustrate the causal path for the creation and maintenance of an RNM. The Catalanian case is an example of how strong initial conditions and successful regional governance lead to a strong RNM, while the Valencian case shows that weak initial conditions can hinder the development of an RNM.

From a broader perspective, we found significant linkages between the intensity and type of regional economic development and the emergence and success of RNMs. Without the resources and organization provided by a powerful group of economic elites, it is unlikely that a coherent regional-nationalist movement can even arise. Under certain circumstances, however, economic growth gives rise to an elite class that instigates and leads a regional-nationalist movement in pursuit of its own economic goals. Once achieving the elites' initial objectives, the economic development that results can further strengthen a regional movement as citizens feel their regional government, not the national government, is responsible for increasing prosperity. Our case studies of Catalonia and Valencia thus suggest that once this full set of regional economic and political processes has developed, an RNM will likely succeed.

Appendix A: Catalanian Interviews

Colomé, Gabriel, Center Opinión del Gobierno, May 17, 2005, Barcelona, Catalonia.

Roig, Xavier, Ex-chief of Staff for the Mayor of Barcelona, May 17, 2005, Barcelona, Catalonia.

Dellunde, Pilar, Secretary of International Politics, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, May 17, 2005, Barcelona, Catalonia.

Fishman, Robert, Visiting Professor of Sociology, UPF, May 17, 2005, Barcelona, Catalonia.

Munoz, Jordi, Graduate Student of Robert Fishman, UPF, May 17, 2005, Barcelona, Catalonia.

Pallares, Frances, Professor and Head of Department of Political Science, UPF, May 18, 2005, Barcelona, Catalonia.

Appendix B: Valencian Interviews

Castelló Cogollos, Rafael, Professor Sociology and Social Anthropology, University of Valencia, May 19, 2005, Valencia, Valencia.

Soler Girones, Jose Vicent, Professor of Applied Economics and ex-Socialist Member of Regional Parliament, University of Valencia, May 19, 2005, Valencia, Valencia.

Morera, Enric, President of Bloc Nacionalista Valenciana, May 26, 2005, Valencia, Valencia.

Álvarez-Coque, José María García, Professor of Applied Economics, Polytechnic University of Valencia, May 26, 2005, Valencia, Valencia.

Ripoll, Rafael, Secretario Autonómico de Relaciones con el Estado y Unión Consellería de Presidencia, IMPIVA, May 27, 2005, Valencia, Valencia.

Escamilla Domingez, Rafael, Area de Marketing y Desarrollo Responsable de Relaciones Externas, IMPIVA, May 27, 2005, Valencia, Valencia.

Fernando, Francisco, External Relations Representative, IMPIVA, May 27, 2005, Valencia, Valencia.

Appendix C: Interviews in the Basque Country

Lopez, Jose Manuel Mata, Dean of the Social Sciences and Communications Faculty, Basque University, May 23, 2005, Bilbao, Basque Country.

Moreno del Rio, Carmelo, Professor of Political Science, Basque University, May 23, 2005, Bilbao, Basque Country.

Paniagua, Alfredo Retortillo, Professor of Political Science, Basque University, May 23, 2005, Bilbao, Basque Country.

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END NOTES

¹ "Our empirical analyses reveal, ironically, that the two most powerful single predictors of regional representation are closely linked to the legacy of the history of the regions and the countries in which they are embedded – even though the mechanisms involved in these historical effects are part of the more general theoretical model of regional collective action, and cannot therefore be construed as alternative explanations to the general model" (Nielsen and Salk 247).

² Generalitat de Catalunya, Historical Origins, <http://www10.gencat.net/gencat/AppJava/en/generalitat/generalitat/origens/moderna.jsp>.

³ On the regional level, CiU held a majority in the Catalanian Parliament for almost all of the 1980s and 1990s. The head of the party during this period, Jordi Pujol, was elected the president of Catalonia in 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1995, and 1999. On the national level, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) formed a governing coalition with CiU when they lost their absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament in 1993. When the PSOE lost their plurality to the Partido Popular (PP) in 1996, the CiU remained in the governing coalition with the PP.

⁴ While both movements consider themselves Valencian, this naming scheme shows the different focus of the two major positions within Valencia: the anti-Catalan identity formed as a distinctly non-Catalan identity, whereas the Valencian identity was not necessarily non-Spanish, but simply formed as supplementary to the dominant Spanish identity.

⁵ This included insisting that Valenciano is a different language than Catalan, when in fact they are nearly identical (a common comparison is that they are as different as American and British English).