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The Brazilianization of Brasília: The Relationship between Center and Periphery in the Brazilian Federal District

by Emily Schulman

On April 21, 1960, after fewer than five years of construction, Brasília was officially inaugurated as Brazil’s third national capital. It was hailed as “the capital of hope,” seen as a force for national unification, economic and social progress, Brazilian pride, and a sense of shared identity. Placed far from the coasts in the Brazilian hinterland, Brasília was also touted as a means by which to open up the immense, largely unpopulated, core of the country. As author and geographer Moisés Gicovate wrote in 1959:

The moving of the capital to the interior, will carry out the miracle of the union of northern, southern, eastern, and western Brazil, and will bring forth a new Brazil, united and strong. The islands of the archipelago will melt and, in their place, the Brazilian continent will arise.

BRASÍLIA will carry out the wonder of transforming the many Brazils, in a single true Brazil.

This “new” and “true” Brazil imagined by Gicovate was embodied in the Pilot Plan, the capital’s Master Plan. This design, revolutionary in the fields of architecture and urban planning, called for “perfect social coexistence” among Brasília’s residents. Once achieved, the city would serve as a model for the rest of the nation, impressing a new social order upon that which currently existed, and catapulting Brazil into modernity. Importantly, in contrast to all other Brazilian cities, there would be no inequality and no impoverished peripheral slums. As Lucio Costa, Brasília’s designer was quick to assert in his report on the Master Plan:

The growth of slums, whether on the city’s outskirts or in the surrounding countryside, should at all costs be prevented. The development company should, within the scope of the proposed outline plan, make provision for decent and economical accommodation for the entire population.

Costa’s concerns stemmed from the worrisome development of enormous slums which encircled the country’s large cities, such Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Recife. Brasília represented the opportunity to break with this pattern through strict, totalizing urban planning.

These lofty ambitions for the capital, however, were not realized, not in the long run or the short run. As many scholars have come to contend, Brasília’s principal weakness was nothing other than Costa’s failure to plan for the growth and development of a periphery. Planned for or not, a periphery developed all the same. In fact, even before inauguration, the city exhibited a great degree of division as opposed to the “perfect social coexistence” it’s planners had envisioned. Anthropologist James Holston has said that, “Brasília is both radically separate from and part of the ‘rest of Brazil,’” a statement that casts doubt on the capital’s purported uniqueness within Brazil. Indeed, as early as a year after the city’s inauguration, one Brazilian journalist was able to comment that “contrary to [city planner] Lucio Costa’s intention, class distinctions are more marked in Brasília than anywhere else in
Brazil. Since then, the capital has often been described as really being two Brasílias—the Plano Piloto for those who are mildly affluent, and the satellite cities for those struggling to get by (the great majority). Or, as David E. Snyder wrote in 1962, “a spectrum of ‘many Brasílias.’” In many respects, what was once touted as an egalitarian city of the future has come to represent a multitude of contradictions, namely the distinctly unequal nature—historically and today—of the capital.

How did the egalitarian city of the future come to be the epitome of Brazilian inequality? How is it that one now encounters a double-sided reality upon traveling to the country’s Federal District, a reality in which the Brasiliense Other looms ever larger? The trajectory of the relationship between Brasília as center and Brasília as periphery is a long one that continues to evolve to this day. More than anything, it is a story of contradictions rooted in the intended exclusivity of the Pilot Plan, and the refusal of those deemed unfit for inclusion to be systematically marginalized. To understand it, one must first look to the roots of the problem: the city’s design and its initial phase of construction. It was during this time that Brasília first began to deal with the problems that would permanently mark its development and character.

During its construction and in the years following inauguration, Brasília generated a large amount of scholarly interest, particularly among architectural theorists. Volumes were written about the groundbreaking structures called for by Niemeyer’s Monumental Axis which was to be the focal point of the Pilot Plan. After this initial flurry, two important anthropological studies were published, David G. Epstein’s Brasília, Plan and Reality: A Study of Planned and Spontaneous Urban Settlement (1973), and James Holston’s The Modernist City (1989). These works provide a detailed examination of the evolution of both the legal and the illegal aspects of the Federal District. Holston has also written a number of articles concerning issues of squatting, both in Brasília and in Brazil in general. Interestingly, there is relatively little scholarship (especially in English) in recent years. Important exceptions include Marcio Oliveira’s 1997 dissertation “The relocation of squatter settlements in Brasília,” and Richard J. Williams’ “Brasília after Brasília” (2007). Apart from these works, much of the current literature on Brasília is in the form of newspaper and magazine articles, government statistics, and information gathered from webpages. This relative lack of recent scholarship makes it difficult to ascertain what the contemporary center-periphery relationship is like in the Federal District. It may also serve as an indication of Brasília’s current place (or lack thereof) in the scholarly imagination, perhaps suggesting that the city no longer holds the allure it once possessed.

It is within this space in the scholarly literature that this paper seeks to place itself. Today, the relationship between central Brasília and its periphery plays out in a very different manner than it did forty years ago. Indeed, it would seem that the Brazilian capital has actually been superseded by its peripheral Others in terms of population and economic importance, a fact that further problematizes the balance (or rather, the imbalance) of power that has marked the city of the future. This paper will explore the evolution of this relationship between the center and the periphery, focusing on the shifting status of the squatter settlements and satellite cities through time. I intend to show that those who built the capital and populated its periphery have a long history of asserting themselves and their rights from within a system of domination and subjugation. This system is one marked by contradictions that ultimately leads to the Brazilianization of the city that was meant to break with all things Brazilian.

Brasília’s Beginnings
From economic and historic standpoints, Brazil began construction on its new capital during a unique moment in time. Boris Fausto and Werner Baer explain Brasília’s emergence as part of the transition from nationalism to developmentism. The “political mystique of development” rooted in the postwar years gave rise to President Juscelino Kubitschek’s program of desenvolvimentismo (developmentalism) and a series of large public works projects. Brasília, which Kubitschek promised would bring “50 years of progress in five,” was the most notable of these initiatives. At the same time, Brazilian intellectuals and artists were swept up in the fervor of high modernism. The modernist proposal was that the state had the ability to change society “by imposing an alternative future embodied in plans.” Thus, the building of Brasília encompassed numerous aims; but more than anything, it was to instill hope for the future and to foment a strong sense of national identity while breaking with the country’s past failures.

Conceived of by head architect Oscar Niemeyer and urban planner Lúcio Costa, both of whom drew heavily from the Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM) and the ideas of Le Corbusier, Brasília was touted as the project that would erase social inequality and propel Brazil into the future. As Costa notes in the introduction to his plan, the capital would be “not the result of regional planning, but the cause; its foundation will be the starting point for the development of a regional plan. For this is a deliberate act of conquest, a gesture of pioneers acting in the spirit of their colonial traditions.” To that end, the city was built in the middle of the hinterland in order to stimulate national unification and rural development, and was strictly designed to guide human behavior and transform Brazilian society. Within the Pilot Plan, people of all socioeconomic classes would live side-by-side in egalitarian apartment complexes known as superquadras.

Beginning in the final months of 1956, the construction of Brasília lured thousands of workers from all over the country with the promise of employment, a better quality of life, and the sense of excitement the new capital inspired. These laborers came to be referred to as candangos, or “the bandeirantes of the twentieth century,” and accomplished the monumental task of erecting the city in under five years. These brave historical actors, however, were working in a setting in which those in charge did not conceive of their presence in the finished product. The intention had been to unveil Brasília “as if it were without a history of construction and occupation. On inauguration day, it planned to reveal a miracle: a gleaming city, empty and ready to receive its intended occupants.” In light of the fact that the workers were never intended to become residents of the city, worker settlements, which necessarily sprung up during the course of construction, were considered temporary. The Free City (Cidade Livre), for example, which offered free land and no taxes, was established with the condition that it would be razed after four years (when Brasília was to be inaugurated) and its residents would have to leave.

By 1958, however, it had become clear that the majority of construction workers, most of whom had encountered far better economic opportunities in the construction zone than in the places from which they had come, were not willing to leave. By this point, there were already an estimated 7,000 people residing in the Free Town, a number that does not include those living in the numerous worker camps within the construction zone itself. Nor does it take into account the more informal settlements, known as land invasions (invasões), and consisting mainly of shacks and tents, which were established by the migrants themselves in order to accommodate their radically increasing numbers. The occupation of land outside of the officially condoned areas (the Free City and the worker camps) was largely tolerated, or at least not actively resisted, by the government during the early days of construction because of the overwhelming need for manpower and the government’s relative lack of oversight.
capability. But this stance changed as the overcrowding in the settlements became extreme, and as the city’s inauguration date approached. The migrants held their ground, however, choosing to fight for legal recognition of their right to land and incorporation into Brasília.

The same year of 1958 saw the first in what would be a long series of squatter settlements transitioning from a status of illegality to one of legality. Taguatinga, which became the first satellite city, and which will serve as the main case study of this paper, was followed by Sobradinho and Gama in 1960, and later by the Free City, which gained permanent legal status in 1961 with the new name Núcleo Bandeirante. Official recognition, however, did not come easily; it was achieved only through squatter resistance, organization, and political strategies that asserted their right to be included within the space and concept of Brasília. Each of these satellites, in addition to those that came later, were established in direct contradiction to Brasília’s Master Plan, and initiated the “Brazilianiz[ation]” of the new capital.

A Plan of Exclusion, A Fight for Legitimacy

Brasília’s periphery did not develop as a cohesive, linear process; rather, it emerged settlement by settlement, so that at any given moment, different groups found themselves in different stages of the fight for formal recognition and growth. Despite this lack of temporal uniformity, the evolution of individual settlements was surprisingly similar throughout the Federal District. For this reason, a study of Brasília’s peripheral development is best undertaken through case study. Taguatinga, which is currently one of the largest satellite cities in the Federal District, serves this purpose well, having been the first settlement to gain legality, and therefore setting a series of precedents that were later followed by other communities. Among these precedents were the formation of residential organizations and the development of political strategies to assert claims of legitimacy. Taguatinga is also a worthy case study because, in addition to signalling the major evolutionary steps of the periphery, it became exemplar of the contradictions and ambiguities that central Brasília’s growing Other came to embody.

The story of Taguatinga begins well before the inauguration of the new capital, before anyone had even heard the name “Taguatinga.” In June of 1958, a serious drought in the Northeast led to a wave of several thousand migrants that descended upon the construction zone and the Free City looking for work. Novacap’s security forces (the GEB), however, were ordered to block their entrance into the city, and they barricaded the highway. Instead of turning back, the migrants squatted on the other side of the barricade, erecting improvised lodgings, and plastering the highway frontage with banners reading “Hail Vila Sara Kubitschek,” “The residents of Vila Sara thank you,” and “Long live dona Sara.” The strategy was two-pronged: First, by invoking the name Sara Kubitschek, they hoped to dissuade the security forces from destroying a place dedicated to the country’s first lady. In effect, it was “a subtle form of blackmail, to prevent any move against the invasion.” Second, the migrants started a rumor that the President’s wife had guaranteed legal property rights to anyone who staked out a land plot. “Hence, the meaning of the sign, ‘The residents thank you, dona Sara’ for supposedly authorizing the settlement and the distribution of the lots.” The rumor found its way to the overcrowded Free City, the work camps, and other squatter settlements. Quickly, there was such a large mass of people at the highway-side land seizure that the security forces were overwhelmed.

Later, when the residential association that had formed within the seizure learned that Kubitschek was to make an appearance in the Free City at the well-known restaurant Barbecue
it organized a large demonstration to assert the residents’ desire to remain on the land they were inhabiting. The squatters touted signs that spoke to their demands “in the banner language of Brasília’s officially legitimating discourses: ‘We founded the Vila Sara Kubitschek,’ ‘Long live President Juscelino,’ ‘We want to stay where we are,’ and the like.”

Holston points out that, these associations understood not just the importance of demonstrating the backing and patronage of an admired benefactor, but also the power of naming to invent such relations. Thus, it placed the land seizure under the protection of Brazil’s First Lady with the unauthorized use of her name as its eponym. In doing so, the squatters hoped both to invest themselves with her aura of legitimacy and to force the regime to recognize the acts committed under it as legitimate.

Thus, squatter associations used the linguistic and symbolic paradigms of those in power to claim rights.

The residential association that was formed in the Vila Sara Kubitschek settlement, and which organized the political campaign to gain legal recognition, was a radical new assertion of political rights within the Federal District, and became an effective model later employed by many other settlements. The association provided previously absent representation for the squatters in their demands against the government. More importantly, as members and constituents of these organizations, squatters became aware of and then effectively asserted their legal rights, transforming themselves into political agents. Though they varied depending upon circumstance, the organizations’ objectives tended to focus on obtaining the legalization or “regularization” of settlements, demanding urban services, and/or defending illegal settlements from government security attempts to demolish them. In doing so, the organizations and the communities they represented found various ways to appropriate state symbols as a means of subversive political strategy that asserted their legitimacy, as seen in Vila Sara Kubitschek. Its residential association began informally, but managed to utilize names, in much the same way the Brazilian government tended to do, to suggest the existence of patronage and therefore its right to exist.

The result of the migrants’ land seizure and subsequent campaign for legal claim to their land was only partially successful. The invasion received word that Kubitschek had mandated the creation of a formal satellite city 25 kilometers from the Pilot Plan. This site, which would be named Taguatinga, would house all those residing in the construction zone. Citing the extreme economic costs that would come from living at such a distance from the center of the city, the squatters initially rejected the offer. Eventually, after several acts of violent resistance, the relocation was carried out with the assistance of Novacap, which had promised to transfer squatters free of charge, reconstruct their shacks upon arrival, begin implementing basic services, and provide medical assistance and transportation to work. Of note, the association that had organized the campaign for legal recognition dissolved after its members were transferred to Taguatinga.

Dissolution of resident associations became a common theme as settlements transitioned from states of illegality to legality. Holston explains this tendency by pointing out the paternal nature of the relationship involved in asserting political demands in Brasília. Whereas the newfound political consciousness gained from collective action can endure when “the quest for legal access to residential property and services is posed as a matter of political rights,” when it is seen merely as government assistance (as in Brasília), “the logic of further
demands inhibits political actions to contest power relations upon which assistance is based.”32

Despite the fact that residents were in fact demanding political rights, much of the language and symbolism upon which these struggles were based (including that of governmental opposition) were rooted in the paternalistic structure of receiving social services and assistance. The strategy of claiming the existence of patronage exemplifies their adherence to the dominant paradigm. By invoking the traditional system of patronage to assert their own legitimacy, the squatters were further entrenched the dominance of the state as the all-powerful patron upon whom they relied. Thus, once the goal of gaining a legal title to their land was achieved, residents were not in a position to transform the system.

Despite the organization’s breakup and the unattractive aspects of the transfer to a site so faraway, the move to Taguatinga set important precedents for the relationship between the government in the Pilot and Plan and the residents of the outlying areas. First, the move was only made possible because Novacap offered various advantages and services, a situation it would find itself in on multiple occasions. Soon, the satellite city had a mobile hospital, nearly a thousand sewage pits, a provisional water network, and individual demarcated lots. Second, and more importantly, the establishment of Taguatinga served as a precedent for the creation of future satellite cities in areas other than Lake Paranoá.33 At the time, the only other settlements that were officially recognized by the government were the Pilot Plan and the communities that predated construction, Planaltina (1859) and Brazilândia (1932). Taguatinga’s creation signalled a complete break with the original Pilot Plan which made no mention of settlements outside of the official confines of the city center. The official status of Taguatinga—which translated into an institutionalized periphery—thus forever changed the course of Brasília’s development.

A final precedent set by Vila Sara Kubitschek’s struggle for legitimation was the manner in which the residential organization organized its political action against the government, establishing a style and strategy which served as a model for later legalization attempts.34 The practices of seizing land, organizing residents, and appropriating notions of legitimacy constituted an entirely new kind of political action in the Federal District, as well as the formation of political identities that previously had not existed. Effectively, a sense of the political power of collective action emerged through the seizure of land, the clandestine construction of houses, and the refusal to leave land they claimed as their own. As Holston writes, “They transformed their members’ actions from mere individual violations of law...into a collective challenge to the government’s organization of Brasília.”35 On the other hand, it also became clear that the relationship between the squatters and the government was inherently unequal. The government, invested with legal and political legitimacy, and backed by the potential force of the police, served a paternal role to which those of the future satellite cities were subordinate.36 Thus, one of the lasting effects of Taguatinga’s establishment (in addition to the later creation of other satellite cities) is paradoxical. Holston synthesizes: on the one hand, “the politicization of domestic life in the periphery yields...new and subversive political identities; on the other, new forms and technologies of political domination.”37 This ominous statement will continue to ring true at various stages in the development of Brasília’s relationship with its periphery.

After Taguatinga was established in 1958, several others quickly followed. Like Taguatinga, each of these cities—as well as others that would follow—achieved legality as a result of the threat posed by “the candango rebellion.”38 Taguatinga continued to serve as a model of the pattern of peripheral development in the Federal District. As a general rule, illegal land occupations imitated the “paradigms of the legitimate social order, rehearsing its
part in the wings so to speak, so that its leaders [could] better argue with the authorities that it deserve[d] urban services.  

Peripheral Growth

The Brasilian periphery continued to grow at an impressive rate, even after the new capital was inaugurated and the principle source of employment (construction) had disappeared. In 1960, the percentage of people of the Federal District residing in the satellite cities was 41.3%; in the Pilot Plan it was 48.4%. Over the following years, the ratio of satellite dwellers to Pilot Plan dwellers changed dramatically, with the satellites representing 67.3% of the Federal District’s population in 1970, 69.7% in 1975, and 72.1% in 1980. During this time, the total number of satellite cities grew as well, reaching 18 by 1994, and currently numbering close to 30.

Taguatinga became one of the fastest growing areas within the Federal District, housing 26 percent of the total population in 1964, making it second only to the Pilot Plan. Interestingly, it developed to look like an imitation of the Pilot Plan. Overlooking the fact that the satellite city did not have the monumentality (low stucco buildings tended to be the rule) or the modern infrastructure (such as paved roads) of that designed by Niemeyer, its layout is reminiscent of the center. Like the Pilot Plan, Taguatinga’s overall design is in the form of a cross which consists of the main avenue, a mall that serves as a divider, and two long residential axes on either side. Also, parts of the city employ the same street numbering system of letters and numbers as that of the Pilot Plan. In the North Sector, the residential area is signified by QN, meaning Quadra Norte, and the commercial area is CN, meaning Comercial Norte. A third letter and a number indicate the position within the given Quadra (for example, QNA-1).

As it and the rest of the Federal District continued to expand, Taguatinga began to exhibit another aspect of the evolution of Brasília’s satellite cities: the ongoing cycle of “rebellion and legitimation” as the periphery developed its own periphery. In January 1960, Taguatinga was the first peripheral city to experience a land seizure on its own outskirts. Once construction had stopped and Brasília was inaugurated, the principle source of work suddenly ceased to exist. Raimundo Matias was one of many people previously employed as construction workers who found themselves homeless due to an inability to afford their current home, or an inability to attain housing because of lack of employment. In desperation, Matias, along with others in similar situations, rebelled, seizing land just outside of Taguatinga, and informally creating Vila Matias.

The campaign for legitimation waged by these invaders mirrored those that happened prior to the capital’s inauguration, making use of state symbols and ideals in an assertion of its pertinence to the Brazilian nation. For example, the invasion was quickly subdivided into orderly plots in the same manner that Taguatinga was divided. This was meant to demonstrate the squatters’ responsibility (despite their needy situation), and to counter accusations of criminality and promiscuity typically voiced by the authorities. Later, in response to police violence, they invoked the Brazilian ideal of “a patriotic trilogy of family, order, and freedom” epitomized by the structure of the family unit. In concentric circles, with men on the outside, women in the middle, and children forming the inner ring (even standing around a flagpole flying the Brazilian flag which, as Holston points out, was upside-down), residents stood in defense of their dwellings. Finally, the settlement’s main square was named the Twenty-first of April Square, demonstrating not only Vila Matias’ relation to the Pilot Plan (which was inaugurated on April 21), but also its residents’ part in its construction and their
affinity for the capital. It was in this square that the settlement was officially recognized by the government, incorporating it into Taguatinga with the new name Quadra South D.\textsuperscript{47} Vila Matias, like Taguatinga before it, served as a precedent and a model for future invasions and legalizations of land surrounding the already established periphery. However, despite the property rights and political identities achieved through such campaigns, upon successfully reaching their objectives, the voluntary associations ceased to exist. Thus, this second round of rebellion and legitimation (which gave rise to many subsequent rounds) ended with residents accepting, whether tacitly or directly, “the anonymity of differential incorporation into the legal but politically subordinated satellite cities.”\textsuperscript{48}

James Holston concludes his chapter entitled “Cities of Rebellion” with the following paragraph which, due to the sense it gives of the trajectory of Brasília’s developing periphery, deserves to be cited in full:

> These cycles of rebellion and legitimation, of mobilization and dissolution, were each discrete in time and space. Yet...the social processes and structures they represent in the formation of the capital’s periphery have been continuous over decades. During the first ten years following the foundation of the satellite cities, nearly 100,000 new migrants became squatters in the Federal District. In 1971, the government launched what was considered its final solution to this illegal periphery: it dismantled over 15,000 shacks and transferred 80,000 squatters to a new satellite city, Ceilândia, created to receive them. However, in the decade that followed that massive cleanup, the government estimates that 18 new illegal settlements have arisen around Brasília and its satellites, with a combined population of over 40,000 squatters (\textit{Jornal de Brasília}, 2 October 1981). No doubt, as historical precedent strongly suggests, the illegal periphery of today will become the legal periphery of tomorrow. Yet, if history is a guide, one must also consider that its incorporation may only expand the periphery’s political subordination, spatial segregation, and stratified inequalities, and so continue to reiterate the paradoxes of Brasília’s utopian premises.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{Situations of Legality and Illegality}

As the above quote by Holston suggests, there is a problematic nature to the notions of what it means to be legally recognized by central Brasília. Interestingly, a situation of “legality” does not necessarily imply incorporation into the life and politics of Brasília (in this case, the Pilot Plan). Inhabitants of the satellite cities exist in a position of complete subordination: they have a minimal amount of political representation, making the assertion of demands impossible or ineffectual; there is often a shortage or complete lack of public services; they do not have access to housing or many of the jobs in the Pilot Plan; and they are physically distant from the perks of the center, meaning that inhabitants must spend a significant amount of money on transportation costs. Conversely, as we have seen, being in a situation of “illegality” in many ways implies a certain amount of political efficacy.
Ironically, it seems to be this position of political efficacy that leads to more acute political and social exclusion.

The government structure of the Federal District is a clear example of the drawbacks of settlement legalization in terms of political rights. As Holston has explained, the political identities developed during the process of legalization did not, in large part, outlast the initial struggle for property rights. The transition to legality actually created a situation of official political subordination to the center of Brasília. As the squatter settlements won their fights for legalization and became satellite cities, residents found themselves with fewer political rights than they had experienced as members of residential associations that came out of illegal settlements.

The administrative and governmental structure of the Federal District, established in the Organic Laws of 1959, plays an important role in the relationship between center and periphery. Most importantly, unlike all other Brazilian cities, there is no representative government in Brasília. The Federal District is divided into 29 administrative regions, one for each of the satellite cities (and one for Brasília), each of which has its own Regional Administrator who is appointed by the governor of the Federal District. This governor is appointed by the president of Brazil, who also has the power to dismiss the individual at will. The president is also vested with the power to appoint judges to sit on the various district courts that were set up by the Organic Laws. Additionally, laws affecting the administrative are voted on by the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District, and police powers are placed under the jurisdiction of the Federal Department of Public Security. Part of the reasoning given for this centralization of governmental power was given in the report that accompanied the Organic Laws. The legislative authors were concerned about “the great inconvenience of the coexistence of federal and local authorities, in the Federal Capital, an inconvenience that translates into a permanent conflict between the two opposite tendencies of these interests, that is, between federal centralism and municipal autonomy.”

Holston argues that the unrepresentative governmental structure “differentially incorporated” those living in the satellite cities by giving them property rights, but stripping them of the political rights with which they had achieved official recognition in the first place. A prefecture was installed in the Federal District with the power to create and staff subprefectures in each of the satellite cities. This prefecture acted as a central authority that effectively had control over the Federal District as a whole, and at the local level of the individual satellite cities through the vector of the subprefectures. This structure has had profound effects on the periphery, depriving residents of the “capacity for collective action, representation, or organization in regulating the rule of these administrations over their affairs.” Effectively, the characteristics of the voluntary associations that had led to the formation of the satellite cities (they were autonomous, their leaders were selected directly by members, they were directly representative) are completely inverted upon legalization. Thus, from the point of view of the satellite cities, their relationship with central Brasília has regressed. The ground they had won by means of symbolic appropriation and subversive action has been taken away, leaving the periphery again subordinated to, and distanced from (in the representative sense), those in power.

Holston asserts that, in combination with the exclusivity of those who are allowed to live in the center, the political subordination of the governmental structure has produced “disenfranchisement and disprivilege” and a “dual social order.” Those on the periphery have become both legally and spatially segregated from the Pilot Plan. In this light, the political “victory” won by squatters upon successfully gaining legal land title, translated into nothing
other than political demobilization at the hands of the government. While it would be difficult to determine whether or not demobilization was the primary objective of the government’s seemingly conciliatory creation of satellite cities, it is clear that the final outcome was, in many ways, exactly that. This interpretation of a “differential incorporation” that came out of legalization sheds a different kind of light on the relationship between Brasília’s center and periphery, placing the center in a decidedly dominant position. “Ironically,” Holston states, “it was this stratification and repression and not the illegal actions of the squatters that more profoundly Brazilianized Brasília.” Thus, as the Federal District has grown, so has the degree of Brasília’s Brazilianness, forever compounding a cycle without a foreseeable end.

Under the military government that came to power on April 1, 1964, the Company for Housing of Social Interest (SHIS—Sociedade de Habitações de Interesse Social) was established. Its attempted outreach to the Federal District’s less fortunate serves as another example of the contradictory nature of becoming legally part of Brasília. One of its programs was aimed at dealing with the housing problems facing those earning less than 2.5 times the minimum wage. Unfortunately, because the program had to be able to pay for itself, SHIS was forced to make a “series of requirements designed to insure that the recipients would be willing and able to keep up with [the payments].” The result, however, was that an entire segment of the population was left unable or unwilling to participate in the program. Instead, many opted for “the free and clear ‘ownership’ of a shack in the squatment...[instead of] the long-term obligation of paying 15 or 20 percent of their wages, with the constant threat of eviction and loss of their home.” For many, then, obtaining a legal claim to a house meant a future of debt. Thus, we see the continuation of illegality in the periphery despite the center’s attempts (though they be insufficient or problematic) to create a situation of legality.

Revisiting the situation of illegality for a moment, and taking the examples of squatting and autoconstruction, we can look at some of the advantages associated with not being officially recognized by, or incorporated into, the official system. The very act of illegally settling on land and engaging in the process of constructing a personal dwelling indicates a certain amount of agency. As Epstein contends: “While relatively powerless and short of resources, the squatters in Brasília are not fatalist or unmotivated putty whose fate depends exclusively upon the whim or wisdom of an elite. The squatter, as well as the university-trained planner and the politician, is an actor in the making of history.” Holston goes even further, theorizing that autoconstruction is important to the process of developing a social identity; an individual begins to recognize his/herself as a propertied citizen and as a participant in mass consumer markets. This engenders the notion of political and social agency, as well as “subjective capacities that not only subvert historically ascribed incapacities but paradoxically actualize the new hegemonies of modern industrial society.” In the context of Brasília, this analysis presents us with a different aspect of the paradox of the periphery: at times, a situation of “illegality” serves to incorporate an individual into the greater society by creating a political identity.

Central Brasília has had its own ways of fighting back and asserting its dominant position, reinforcing this paradox in which the legal realm is not always advantageous for the peripheral actor. In 1987, UNESCO awarded Brasília with the status of Historical and Cultural Heritage of Humanity, a distinction which has also been bestowed upon places such as the Taj Mahal and the Great Pyramid of Cheops. The Pilot Plan in its entirety, the green belt between the Pilot Plan and the satellite cities, and the area around Lake Paranoá (where upper-class residences are located) were included under the distinction, and are thereby guaranteed preservation. This was followed in 1990 by the Brazilian federal government’s
declaration that the city be *tombada*, registering it in the Book of Historical Preservation, mandating that:

> Any alteration in the height of buildings, in the layout of roads, avenues, and lots, in the use and function of lots, in the unbuilt green areas, within the perimeter preserved, should, on principle, be avoided. Necessary alterations should be profoundly studied and carefully executed to guarantee the preservation of the essential characteristics of the Plano Piloto and its quality of life.⁵¹

This “entombment” of Brasília had the clear intention of protecting it from the potential encroachment of the ever-growing periphery. Williams argues that the prevailing sentiment was one “unconcerned about the reasons for the invasion [of the impoverished settlements, particularly those near the city’s bus station], or what might happen to those residents after the situation was corrected...There was no understanding that the ‘invasion’ cited above might actually have been a function of the lived reality of the Pilot Plan, not something alien to it.”⁶² Effectively, then, the legal preservation of Brasília is another way of asserting the center’s importance and dominance over that of the rest of the Federal District, and eternalizing the segregation it has imposed upon peripheral residents.

**Peripheral No More?**

For much of its early history, then, Brasília’s periphery seems to have been peripheral in the broadest sense of the word. More recently, however, there appear to be some indications that this is no longer the case. Better and more accessible means of transportation, greater social interaction, and the increased economic importance of the satellite cities have shifted the balance, in certain ways threatening the center’s dominant position. On the other hand, other factors indicate that Brasília is in no danger of losing ground (politically, as opposed to physically) to that which surrounds it.

Since the transfer of the first land invasion to the site that became Taguatinga in 1958, the distance of the satellite cities to the Pilot Plan has been raised as an indicator of peripheral subjugation by the center. The model of satellite cities comes from Ebenezer Howard’s theory of the Garden City, which incorporates economically self-sufficient settlements grouped around a larger, central city that provides them with a certain amount of services. In Brasília’s case, however, as architectural historian Norma Evenson points out, the peripheral settlements are not true satellites, but essentially dormitory towns for workers in Brasília, and most of the residents are subjected to an inconvenient and expensive regimen of bus commuting.”⁶³ Indeed, transportation between the satellite cities and the Pilot Plan is notoriously costly; both in terms of the financial burden and the time it takes to complete the commute. Israel Barreiro de Barros is a resident of Samambaia, a satellite city that has become the twelfth administrative region in the Federal District. In a 1989 interview, he reported that each day he spent two hours commuting to the Pilot Plan to look for work in construction or as a handyman, and another two hours to get home. The bus fare cost him half of his monthly salary (about 400,000 cruzeiros, or about $54), which at that time was set at 4,800 cruzeiros (about $0.64).⁶⁴ This situation is similar to other cities in Brazil, where social class divisions and segregation place the poor in outlying areas in much the same way. Thus, those who can least afford it are those who must absorb the cost of transportation. In Brasília, this separation and its related burden are even more marked in the capital given the green belt that stands between the center and the periphery, making the distance needing to be traveled that much greater.⁶⁵
This has changed in recent years, however, with the construction of Brasília’s subway system, the heavy rail metro. Introduced around 2000, it has had important effects on both the Federal District’s central and peripheral spaces, most significantly by easing the temporal and financial burden of those living far from places of work or study (effectively, those who live in the outskirts but must commute to the Pilot Plan on a regular basis). In 2007, its hours of operation were extended (it now functions from 6:00am until 11:30pm), and eight new stations, almost all of which are in satellite cities, are currently under construction. The extended schedule is especially important for those who work overnight shifts (jobs that are primarily filled by residents of the periphery) because it allows them to take advantage of this quicker and easier way to commute. With these changes in place, the subway system now transports more than 100,000 passengers per day, meaning that the practical distance between the center and the periphery has, for many people, contracted.

Population wise, the satellite cities represent a force much greater than the Pilot Plan. By 1973, Taguatinga had already surpassed central Brasília in terms of its number of inhabitants. In 2000, the official population of the Federal District was a little more than two million people. If the illegal settlements were taken into account, that figure grew to an estimated three million. Within that, the administrative region of Brasília made up just 9.6 percent, or 198,422 people. These figures underscore the numerical importance of the periphery. Richard J. Williams points out that, of the twenty-nine regions, only two of them were decreasing in population at this point. Except for Lago Sul, a satellite city that constitutes RA XVI, all the peripheral areas of the Federal District had positive growth, in one case at a rate of 19 percent per year. The Pilot Plan, on the other hand, has been slowly decreasing in size for several years due to its ageing population and the “shifting economic base of the metropolis,” which now bends toward Taguatinga. Indeed, Williams declares that “Brasília has become, inadvertently, ‘all periphery.’” R.V. Zein goes as far as to say that “the Pilot Plan itself [has become] structurally, if not symbolically, marginal.”

Economically, the satellite cities are similarly powerful. Rather than mere appendages dependent on the center for survival, they have their own life: “These, like quasi-independent cells, are given their own life.” By the 1980s, Taguatinga’s large number of commercial establishments had made the city independent in terms of its consumer sector. For example, practically all residents buy their food products within the city itself. More than that, many residents of other satellite cities such as Núcleo Bandeirante, Gama, Guará, and Brazlândia were also opting to do their shopping in Taguatinga rather than the center, since goods tend to be cheaper. In effect, then, the city is increasingly the economic center of Brasília as a whole. Perhaps more importantly, the image of Taguatinga has been changing along with its growing economic prowess. Federico de Holanda goes as far as to say that Taguatinga “has even become fashionable.” No longer the frontier settlement lacking in most services and infrastructure; it is now a city that is ever more “‘metropolitan’ in character, having a diversity of urban functions, a mixture of social classes, an economic centre, and even a cultural life.” It stands in direct contrast to the Pilot Plan which has become “a calculated negation of the urban.”

Recently, there have been other public works projects in the satellite cities that have added to a sense of peripheral independence and self-sufficiency. For example, in January 2008, a covered court with the capacity to house almost four-thousand people was inaugurated in Paranoá. The governor asserted that the project was the result of an efficient and decentralized effort, something that he seems to be much in favor of. He explained further: “A public works project done by the government of the Federal District would take
much longer and also cost much more. The administrators know what the community wants, meaning they can serve in a way that is more able and efficacious.\textsuperscript{78}

The wording on the official Sobradinho website is also telling of this recent shift toward satellite cities asserting their self-sufficiency. An excerpt from the site’s brief history of the city reads:

\begin{quote}
In 1961 there were already 8,000 families installed in the small city. Today, with more than 200,000 inhabitants, and surrounded by more than 100 condominiums and extensive rural area, it is growing and leaving behind its fame as a dormitory city, conquering its own problems and searching out its independence, with commerce that is ever stronger and more attractive to investments from large firms.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

The use of the word “conquering” harks back to the frontier atmosphere in which Brasília was constructed. As Costa had proclaimed, the city’s foundation was “a deliberate act of conquest, a gesture of pioneers acting in the spirit of their colonial traditions.”\textsuperscript{80} By invoking the rhetoric used to mythologize the original idea of the capital complex, Sobradinho effectively inserts itself into the national project of the 1950s. At the same time, it asserts its self-sufficiency and individual grandeur. As a distinct entity, Sobradinho is able to attract investment, solve its own problems, provide for its citizens, and continue to grow. Emphasizing its point, the webpage later reads: “It bears the entire infrastructure of a ‘Large City.’”\textsuperscript{81}

The website also reveals Sobradinho’s current ambition to take advantage of its surroundings and become an eco-tourism capital: “Due to the privilege of its natural surroundings, this city in the hinterland is investing a lot, with the intent of becoming the Candango Capital of Ecotourism.”\textsuperscript{82} Again, the choice of the word “Candango” is an act of appropriation. The image of the “candangos” who came from all corners of Brazil to construct the capital of the future becomes an element of Sobradinho’s plans to convert itself into a tourist attraction and economic powerhouse. The project is an extension of the original imagining of Brasília, tying the satellite city to the center at a psychological level. The website suggests an evolving way in which the satellite cities are conceiving of their relationship with the Pilot Plan, recognizing their growing importance and ability to assert themselves and their needs in a more forceful and effective way than ever before.

Taking these figures into account, the conception of what constitutes “Brasília” is no longer (or perhaps has never been) straightforward. For example, as one website dedicated to the city explains:

\begin{quote}
The fact that [Administrative Region] RA-I is called ‘Brasília’ causes some confusion. Many believe that the ‘city of Brasília’ is just the area corresponding to RA-I, and consider the other RAs as one city each. Other people (including the author of this website) believe that the city of Brasília includes the urban areas of all the 29 Administrative Regions.\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

The relationship between the Pilot Plan and the satellite cities is a subjective one, and, at times, even a politically-loaded one because “Brasília” can mean many different things. In the strictly administrative sense, it is only the first administrative region, of which Asa Sul, Asa Norte, and the Pilot Plan are a part. Some, however, consider Lago Sul and Lago Norte
(which constitute two separate administrative regions), in addition to RA 1, as Brasília. To this, others would further include two more administrative regions: Sudoeste e Octogonal and Cruzeiro. Finally, there are those who consider Brasília to encompass all the administrative regions of the Federal District, meaning the Pilot Plan and all its satellite cities. The website’s author, Baptista Areal, explains the political implications of the various interpretations:

When one wants to show Brasília as a big and important city, it is common to say it has "more than two million inhabitants". In this case, definition 4 is in mind. However, when someone talks about qualities such as "the large green areas" (which are not present in many satellite cities) he has in mind definition 1 or 2. One can easily see that the meaning of the word Brasília is dependent upon the person using it and the context.

The present-day city of Águas Claras, a middle-class suburb about 20 kilometers from the Pilot Plan, is another example of the changing nature of how Brasília is imagined. Williams asserts that the official conception of the city “not only increasingly includes the periphery, but sublimates it.” He considers this satellite-gone-affluent, which was incorporated into the Federal District in May 2003, to be “the headquarters of the city’s middle class.” The city was designed by Brasília-based architect Paulo Zimbres, who conceived of it as a “continuation” of the urbanism of the Pilot Plan within the metropolitan region.

In certain respects, the continuation of Brasília’s urban center goes beyond the middle-class and affluent outlying areas. In the last few decades, it has become increasingly common to see bars on and walls protecting private residences throughout Latin America. This has also been the case in Brazil, but in recent years in Brasília it has also become commonplace to see them guarding the middle class, lower class, and even poverty-stricken residences of the satellite cities. “One thing always strikes visitors to this metropolitan jigsaw puzzle: the number of dwellings—whether elegant villas, humble wooden shacks or residential complexes—that are surrounded by metal railings.”

There is a practical explanation for their prevalence. As residents of the poorer areas of the periphery attest, petty thieves have become discouraged by the hi-tech security systems now used in rich areas and even in some middle-class neighborhoods; they have therefore moved on to lower-class neighborhoods where they can more easily steal from inhabitants. But Martine Jacot and Licia Valladares offer a second explanation as well:

The prevailing impression is that each migrant family somehow wants to show by means of railings that it has carved out a fiefdom, however small, and that its dream has come true here in the federal district, at the gates of what is known as ‘official Brazil.’

They continue:

The railings are part of this world of symbols and values. They are also to some extent a counterpoint to Costa and Niemeyer’s central zone, with its avant-garde concrete buildings and monuments. The inhabitants of the other Brasília only go into the capital, the city of the ruling class, to work there or to catch a bus home. The railings are perhaps the response of the poor to the social and geographical
The use of railings, then, points to a different kind of assertion into the Pilot Plan. The impoverished periphery that was never intended to be is claiming its place within the concept of Brasília; they are able to share in the middle- and upper-class (those segments of the population for whom Brasília was intended) fears of robbery. Holston uses similar analysis for the tendency to decorate autoconstructed houses, what he refers to as “performative displays,” arguing that they “subvert deep stigmas of real and imagined ignorance that derive from the official exclusion of the poor from the discourses of high culture and from their condemnation by its agents to a lowbrow and unaesthetic existence as a result.” While it is true that the upper classes do not recognize these subversions, Holston claims that the simple act of “pushing against the restrictions of the working-class knowledge-world, these distinctions enact real possibilities of a changed social order because they help create new agencies and subjectivities for it.” These aesthetic practices, then, play their own part in reforming the relationship between center and periphery.

The “official imagination” of Brasília seems to be changing even within the realm of scholarship. Federico de Holanda’s work, which was written in 2002, represents one of the only architects or architectural historians to have included the periphery in his work related to the city. As Williams points out:

[Holanda’s] O Espaço de Exceção imagines the city in holistic terms and is open-minded about the possibility of urban life existing in places other than the centre. The study treats the Federal District as a single entity, and explores the multiple spaces in which urbanity might be found to lie; among Holanda’s conclusions is that Taguatinga increasingly is ‘metropolitan’ in character, having a diversity of urban functions, a mixture of social classes, an economic centre, and even a cultural life....By contrast, the Monumental Axis of the Pilot Plan is not urban at all.

Brasília as Typically Brazilian?

Evenson asserts that, if the city and its planners had been able to achieve the goal of preventing the development of an impoverished periphery, Brasília would have been completely unique. As it is, however, the capital has become just another center surrounded by a poor periphery. To be sure, in certain respects Brasília has taken on a structure and appearance quite similar to that of most Brazilian cities: it has a central core surrounded by an impoverished periphery that is politically, socially, and economically disadvantaged. Also similar to other cities, the capital has had to deal with a rapid, seemingly endless influx of poor migrants who, hailing from impoverished areas throughout the country, come seeking work and a better quality of life. Squatting practices, which arose partly from this massive migration, and have been so important to the city’s development, are not original to Brasília, or to Brazil in general. Indeed, it is a typical response to the need for shelter in situations of urban expansion in underdeveloped countries.

Brasília’s inability to avoid Brazilianization is not surprising. Much to the contrary, the capital’s evolution seems to have been inevitable; despite Niemeyer, Costa, and Kubitschek’s intentions to create a city that would transform the country and its people, it was never possible for Brasília to develop in any way other than it did. Even before inauguration,
the city was marked by uniquely Brazilian circumstances, as well as uniquely Brazilian reactions to such circumstances. As Journalist James Scott writes:

The unregulated Brasília—one might call it the real Brasília—is quite different from the original vision. Instead of a classless administrative city, it is a city marked by commerce, busyness, self-selection, and segregation. The unplanned neighborhoods of the rich and of the poor are not mere accidents; one could argue that they are unavoidable companions to the artificial order at the plan’s center.  

The “unavoidability” inherent in the way the relationship between center and periphery in the Federal District has played out, both historically and contemporarily, must also be judged in terms of the development model that served as a backdrop to Brasília’s founding. The capital represents many of the failures of the government to foresee, and later to respond to, the changing needs of its citizens as the country moved to industrialize and modernize. Among these new conditions was the enormous migration of Brazilians from rural areas to urban centers of industry and opportunity, such as Brasília. The utopianism embedded in the Pilot Plan’s egalitarian aspirations, coupled with the failure to provide for future peripheral development, amounted to a grave misreading of the realities of the development process. Such a misreading was the same one that marked other Brazilian cities, such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, as well as many cities throughout Latin America. In this way, Brasília takes its place within a long tradition of center-periphery relationships.

On the other hand, it is difficult to consider Brasília a city just like any other, given its history and ideological foundations. Niemeyer, Costa, and Kubitschek all had the clear intention to create something revolutionary, something that would not be related in any way to Brazil’s problems. In trying to erase and avoid any mark of the Brazil that came before it, the capital was to create a new shared past based not on where it had come from, but instead on where it wanted to go. In other words, it was supposed to be decontextualized. While they may not have succeeded in breaking with the surrounding Brazilian context, one must acknowledge that much of Brasília was revolutionary—its compressed construction time, the monumentality of the Pilot Plan, its unlikely location—all suggest Brasília’s singularity.

But what do we make of the “real Brasília” with which we are confronted today? It certainly does not seem to reflect that to which Gicovate referred in 1959. In terms of size, it is the periphery, as opposed to the Pilot plan, that is—and has been for some time—carrying out a campaign of conquest. The economic and numeric eclipsing of Brasília’s core by its peripheral rings may be the final, drawn-out form of subversive resistance to be asserted by these legally subordinated actors. Williams believes, perhaps somewhat ominously, that “the immense city round about represents Brasilia’s, and, most likely, Brazil’s, future.” But even if the capital’s periphery does not completely engulf its center, it is unquestionable that, as Williams synthesize, “it requires understanding, not dismissal, for the city to make much sense at all.”
1 Sam Dillon, “’Hope’ fades for Brazilian capital” *Toronto Star* (July 8, 1990), pg. H.3.
7 James Holston, “The Spirit of Brasilia: Modernity as Experiment and Risk,” 541.
8 Vale, 121.
13 Vale, 6.
16 Holston, (1989), 199.
18 Holston, “The Spirit of Brasilia;” 552.
20 Epstein, 111-12.
23 Epstein, 67.
26 Barbecue JK is another example of appropriating names and symbols clearly associated with the state and, therefore, with legitimacy. Here, the letters “JK” refer to President Juscelino Kubitschek, who was often referred to by his initials. The President frequented the restaurant during Brasilia’s construction. (Holston 1989, 262).
27 Holston (1989), 262.
28 Holston (1989), 262.
29 Holston (1989), 259.
30 Holston (1989), 262. Holston delineates three different types of organizations: those that did not develop “formal administrative structure or corporate features;” those that “developed administrative structure and some corporate features but lacked the presumption of perpetuity;” and those that “developed as offshoots of fully corporate groups but were similar in other ways to the second type.”
33 Epstein, 68.
35 Holston (1989), 259.
36 Epstein, 68.
37 Holston (1991), 453.
38 Holston, “The Spirit of Brasília,” 552. James Holston explains his use of the word “rebellion” to describe the fight for formal recognition of the illegal settlements by saying that it was not only “an organized defiance of authority…but also because it constituted a radically new pattern of political organization and action in the Federal District (Holston 1989, 259).

41 Epstein, 71.
43 Holston (1989), 286.
44 Holston (1989), 286-87. Holston explains that, upon job loss, construction workers could no longer reside in the work camps (which offered housing as an employer). When they tried to resettle in a city such as Taguatinga, they were confronted with the new regulation stipulating that, in order to qualify for property rights, one had to supply proof of continuous employment.
45 Holston (1989), 287.
46 Holston (1989), 287.
47 Holston (1989), 287.
50 Holston (1989), 275.
51 Holston (1989), 274-78.
52 Holston (1989), 278.
53 Holston (1989), 278.
54 Holston, “The Spirit of Brasília,” 552.
55 Epstein, 92. Epstein notes that in 1967, the minimum wage was around NCr$100, or US$37, meaning that 2.5 times that amount would be slightly less than US$100.
56 Epstein, 92.
57 Epstein, 93.
58 Epstein, 177.
62 Williams, 3.1.
63 Evenson, 491.
64 Peter Eisner, “Hard Rain Falls on Brazil’s Poor Collor out, but hardship remains” Newsday (Oct 30, 1992), 15.
65 Evenson, 179.
66 “Brasília, Brazil,” http://www.zonalatina.com/Zladata156.htm. I have been unable to find the exact date when the subway system was inaugurated. This website indicates that, as of 2000, the system was in place and being run on an experimental basis, but still had not begun commercial operations by the end of the year.
70 Williams, 4.3.
71 Williams, 4.3.
72 Williams, 4.1.
74 Vasconcelos, “Taguatinga,” 44.
75 Williams, 4.6.
76 Federico de Holanda, O Espaço de Exceção (Brasília: Editora UNB, 2002), 357 in Williams, 4.5.
77 Williams, 4.5.
“Sobradinho, uma Grande Pequena Cidade” http://sobradinho.com.br/?m=sobradinho-df&a=apresentacao. “Em 1961 já eram mais de 8.000 famílias instaladas na pequena cidade. Hoje, com mais de 200.000 habitantes e rodeada por mais de 100 condomínios e extensa área rural, está crescendo e deixando pra trás sua fama de cidade dormitório, conquistando seus próprios problemas e buscando sua independência, com comércios cada vez mais fortes e atraentes a investimentos de grandes grupos.”

Costa in Vale, 117.


Costa in Vale, 117.

“Sobradinho, uma Grande Pequena Cidade” http://sobradinho.com.br/?m=sobradinho-df&a=apresentacao. “Por ter uma natureza privilegiada, essa cidade serrana está investindo muito, com intuito de se tornar a Capital Candanga do Eco-turismo.”


Williams, 4.5.


Jacot and Valladares, “A brasileian’s home is a castle.”

Holston (1991), 462.

Williams, 4.5.

Evenson, 174.

Sanders, “Urban Growth and Public Policy in Brasilia’s Satellite Cities.”

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