POSC 325 Corruption, Clientelism, and Political Machines **Spring 2018**

SYLLABUS

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Course Description

Motivated by the literature on "quality of democracy," this course delves into theories of accountability, government responsiveness, transparency, and other major aspects of governance. It explores these concepts in democratic and nondemocratic regimes by focusing on corrupt and clientelistic politics in a variety of regions, including Latin America, Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, the post-Soviet countries, and East and Southeast Asia. Topics covered in the course include vote-buying and other forms of electoral fraud, the influence of money in campaigns, kickback schemes and governance, crony capitalism, clientelism and political machines, and varieties of accountability systems and institutional reform.

What Is Expected of Students

Students will be expected to read, think, criticize, and form arguments. Outside of the classroom, this means that students must engage with the reading assignments and required audiovisual materials. Inside the classroom, the work in this class is highly interactive, involving much debate and discussion, sometimes in formal, timed settings, and sometimes in less formal formats. The best students will be critical but balanced in their assessments, and they will develop coherent arguments that they can defend in their writing and in their classroom discussions and debates. Although students' own life experiences and opinions are welcome and valued in this class, more frequently students will be asked to defend or analyze perspectives quite different from their own. The effectiveness of their arguments will be judged as rigorously as if they were personally held. Any student who believes that they will have difficulty taking on a particular position or listening to a certain point of view, ought to communicate their concerns to the professor before class or during office hours.

Materials

This course uses a variety of written and audiovisual materials that will be available on Dropbox and Google Drive in most cases. The course also **requires three books**, which are presently available at the bookstore:

Susan Rose-Ackerman and Bonnie J. Palifka, *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform* 2nd Ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Ray Fisman and Miriam A. Golden, *Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Susan Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco, *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Grading

As a true research seminar the assessment of students' performance will focus on the process and work product of sustained research. The seminar paper has several graded components: the quality of the first draft, the oral presentation, and the final draft. Seminar participation in the form of sustained discussion of readings and cases as well as structured debate performances will account for the rest of the evaluation. The grade breakdown follows:

Debates	**10%**
First Draft	**20%**
Oral Research Presentation	**10%**
Final Draft	**40%**
Class Participation	**20%**

The Debates

This seminar will use a series of adversarial debates (4x4) to address the literature on corruption and clientelism in comparative perspective. Students will be instructed in how to organize these debates and how to participate with an emphasis on rejoinder and argument development. Each student will participate in at least two debates.

The Seminar Paper

The culmination of student work in this seminar will be the composition of a seminar paper of 20-25 pages of text (typed, double-spaced, 12cpi, one-inch margins, paginated) and a research bibliography of a minimum of three pages, single-spaced. All drafts of the work prior to the final as well as the final must be handed in by 5 p.m. on the student's directory on Dropbox on the due date (see below). All files, except for data files, must be in PDF format.

The composition of the seminar paper will be broken down into the following steps:

(1) By Thursday, April 5, students will have decided upon a research topic in consultation with me. Each student will prepare a preliminary abstract of the project.

(2) By Friday, April 13, students will hand in a copy of a preliminary research bibliography of no fewer than 3 pages, single-spaced. A handout will define the proper citation and bibliographic reference format for the paper. Weak bibliographies and/or bibliographies that do not follow the required format will generate negative points assessable on the rough draft score.

(3) By Thursday, May 10, students will hand in a first draft of the argumentative section of their paper (the first seven-eight pages) with an updated abstract and bibliography.

(4) On May 28-30, each student will orally present their research for no less than 15 minutes apiece in the research seminar. All colleagues will offer their input. If possible, we will schedule an evening session to free up the schedule at the end of the course.

(5) On Monday, June 4, the final draft of the seminar paper will be due at 5:00 p.m. on Dropbox.

Consultation with me during each of these steps is crucial. We will also discuss the format and direction of paper topics and issues *as part of the normal discussion of the research seminar*. One of the most important lessons of the seminar is that good research depends upon the input and support of colleagues. Each student will be expected to contribute their share to this effort.

Class Participation

Typically, I will begin each class session by offering a general overview of the issues to be discussed. I may also present you with a set of reading and discussion questions to structure our deliberations. After the overview portion, the seminar will proceed to student-led discussion. I will conclude each class session with a brief review of the authors and readings for the next meeting. Whenever possible, each class will have a break of about 10-15 minutes.

The Grading Scale

I will be using the following grading scale in this course:
98-100 A+
94-97 A
91-93 A-
88-90 B+
83-87 B
79-82 B-
76-78 C+
72-75 C
68-71 C-
67/below D/F

Academic Misconduct

Given the fact that academe relies upon the ethical conduct of scholars, students are held to the same standards in their own work. Any act of academic dishonesty or misconduct will be referred to the Office of the Dean. For further information, see the useful handout on "Avoiding Academic Misconduct."

Special Needs

Carleton College is committed to providing equitable access to learning opportunities for all states. The Disability Services office (Burton Hall 03) is the campus office that collaborates with students

who have disabilities to provide and/or arrange reasonable accommodations. If you have, or think you may have, a disability (e.g., mental health, attentional, learning, autism spectrum disorders, chronic health, traumatic brain injury and concussions, sensory, or physical), please contact Chris Dallager, Director of Disability Services, by calling 507-222-5250 or sending en email to cdallager@carleton.edu to arrange a confidential discussion regarding equitable access and reasonable accommodations.

NOTE: Readings must be completed for the dates assigned below.

SECTION 1

UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION AND CLIENTELISTIC POLITICS

Definition, Prevalence, and Effects of Corruption (Monday, March 26)

Fisman and Golden, chs. 2-4.

Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, ch. 1.

Dragana Bodruzic. 2016. "Vice or Coping Mechanism? Bridging Political Science and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Corruption." *Critique of Anthropology* 36:4: 363-379.

Distributive Politics (Wednesday, March 28)

Stokes et al., ch. 1 and ch. 2 (pp. 31-54).

Javier Auyero. 2000. "The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account," *Latin American Research Review* 35:3: 55-81.

Tina Hilgers. 2011. "Clientelism and Conceptual Stretching: Differentiating Among Concepts and Among Analytical Levels." *Theory and Society* 40:5 (September): 567-588.

Agency in Distributive and Corrupt Politics (Monday, April 2)

Fisman and Golden, ch. 5.

Stokes et al., chs. 3-4.

Simeon Nichter and Michael Peress. 2017. "Request Fulfilling: When Citizens Demand Clientelist Benefits." *Comparative Political Studies* 50:8: 1086-1117.

Martin Williams. 2017. "The Political Economy of Unfinished Development Projects: Corruption, Clientelism, or Collective Choice?" *American Political Science Review* 111:4 (November): 705-723.

Cultures of Corruption (Wednesday, April 4)

Fisman and Golden, ch. 6.

Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, ch. 7.

Aaron Adibe Agbo and Emmanuel Ifeanyi Iwundu. 2016. "Corruption as a Propensity: Personality and Motivational Determinants Among Nigerians." *The Journal of Psychology* 150:4: 502-526.

Recommended: Eugenio Paradiso. 2016. "Football, Clientelism and Corruption in Argentina: An Anthropological Inquiry." *Soccer and Society* 17:4: 480-495.

Recommended: Theodor Tudoroiu. 2017. "No, Prime Minister: PhD Plagiarism of High Level Public Officials." *European Review* 25:4: 623-641.

Foreign Imposition of Anti-Corruption Cultures: The Case of the FCPA (Friday, April 6)

Convocation address by Matteson Ellis, Miller & Chevalier, Washington, D.C.

Mateo J. de la Torre. 2016. "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Imposing an American Definition of Corruption on Global Markets." *Cornell International Law Journal* 49:2: 469-495.

SECTION 2

VARIETIES OF STATES AND BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION

Bureaucracies and Corruption (Monday, April 9)

Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, ch. 2 & 8.

Katherine Bersch, Sérgio Praça, and Matthew M. Taylor. 2017. "State Capacity, Bureaucratic Politicization, and Corruption in the Brazilian State." *Governance* 30:1 (January): 105-124.

Nicholas Charron, Carl Dahlstrom, Mihaly Fazekas, and Victor Lapuente. 2017. "Careers, Connections, and Corruption Risks: Investigating the Impact of Bureaucratic Meritocracy on Public Procurement Processes." *Journal of Politics* 79:1: 89-104.

Bo Rothstein. 2015. "The Chinese Paradox of High Growth and Low Quality of Government: The Cadre Organization Meets Max Weber." *Governance* 28:4: 533-548.

Economic Policy and Agencies of Corruption (Wednesday, April 11)

Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, ch. 3.

Giorgio d'Agostino, John Dunne, and Luca Pieroni. 2016. "Corruption and Growth in Africa." *European Journal of Political Economy* 43: 71-88.

Ourania Dimakou. 2015. "Bureaucratic Corruption and the Dynamic Interaction Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy." *European Journal of Political Economy* 40: 57-78.

Recommended: Cheol-Sung Lee and Andrew Schrank. 2010. "Incubating Innovation or Cultivating Corruption? The Developmental State and the Life Sciences in Asia." *Social Forces* 88:3 (March): 1231-1253.

Crony Capitalism, Mafias, and Corruption (Monday, April 16)

Paul Dragos Aligica and Vlad Tarko. 2014. "Crony Capitalism: Rent Seeking, Institutions and Ideology." *Kyklos* 67 (May): 156-176.

Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, ch. 9.

Abby Innes. 2016. "Corporate State Capture in Open Societies: The Emergence of Corporate Brokerage Party Systems." *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 30:3 (August): 594-620.

Social Policy, Clientelism, and Corruption (Wednesday, April 18)

Stokes et al., ch. 6.

Carl Dahlstrom, Johannes Lindvall, and Bo Rothstein. 2013. "Corruption, Bureaucratic Failure and Social Policy Priorities." *Political Studies* 61: 523-542.

Aaron Ansell and Ken Mitchell. 2011. "Models of Clientelism and Policy Change: The Case of Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes in Mexico and Brazil." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 30:3: 298-312.

Recommended Event: The *Foro Latinoamericano* (Friday, April 20-Saturday, April 21) – Populism and Democracy in Latin America (see brochure information for speakers)

SECTION 3

ELECTORAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL MACHINES

Corruption, Clientelism, and Political Institutions (Monday, April 23)

Fisman and Golden, ch. 7.

Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, ch. 11.

Christopher Kam. 2017. "The Secret Ballot and the Market for Votes in 19th Century British Elections." *Comparative Political Studies* 50:5: 594-635.

Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro. 2012. "What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism." *American Journal of Political Science* 56:3 (July): 568-583.

Political Machines and Subnational Authoritarianism (Wednesday, April 25)

Vladimir Gelman. 2010. "The Dynamics of Subnational Authoritarianism: Russia in Comparative Perspective." *Russian Politics and Law* 48:2 (March-April): 7-26.

Jordan Gans-Morse, Sebastián Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter. 2014. "Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 58:2 (April): 415-432.

Edward Aspinall. 2014. "When Brokers Betray: Clientelism, Social Networks, and Electoral Politics in Indonesia." *Critical Asian Studies* 46:4 (December): 545-570.

MIDTERM BREAK (Monday, April 30)

Electoral Fraud and Vote-Buying (Wednesday, May 2)

Stokes et al. chs. 7 (ch. 8 recommended).

Rodion Skovoroda and Tomila Lankina. 2017. "Fabricating Votes for Putin: New Tests of Fraud and Electoral Manipulations from Russia." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 33:2 (March): 100-123.

F. Daniel Hidalgo and Simeon Nichter. 2016. "Voter Buying: Shaping the Electorate through Clientelism." *American Journal of Political Science* 60:2 (March): 436-455.

Ezequiel González-Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, and David Nicerkson. 2015. "Legitimacy Buying: The Dynamics of Clientelism in the Face of Legitimacy Challenges." *Comparative Political Studies* 48:9: 1127-1158.

Recommended: Jack Edelson, Alexander Alduncin, Christopher Krewson, James Sieja, and Joseph Uscinski. 2017. "The Effect of Conspiratorial Thinking and Motivated Reasoning on Belief in Election Fraud." *Political Research Quarterly* 70:4 (December): 933-946.

Campaign Finance as the Lifeblood of Corruption (Monday, May 7)

Adam Lioz. 2017. "Limiting the Limits: Principles to Protect Free Expression While Fighting the Power of Big Money in Politics." *Election Law Journal* 16:1 (March): 57-74.

Omer Gokcekus and Sertac Sonan. 2017. "Political Contributions and Corruption in the United States." *Journal of Economic Policy Reform* 20:4 (December): 360-372.

Marcus Mietzner. 2015. "Dysfunction by Design: Political Finance and Corruption in Indonesia." *Critical Asian Studies* 47:4: 587-610.

SECTION 4

ACCOUNTABILITY-ENHANCING REFORMS

Bureaucratic and Civil Service Reform (Wednesday, May 9)

Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, chs. 4-5.

Anil Hira. 2016. "Broken Windows: Why Culture Matters in Corruption Reform." *Journal of Developing Societies* 32:1 (March): 1-16.

Jennifer Bussell. 2010. "Why Get Technical? Corruption and the Politics of Public Service Reform in the Indian States." *Comparative Political Studies* 43:10 (October): 1230-1257.

Electoral and Campaign Finance Reform (Monday, May 14)

Zim Nwokora. 2014. "The Distinctive Politics of Campaign Finance Reform." *Party Politics* 20:6 (November): 918-929.

Christopher Kulesza, Christopher Witko, and Eric Waltenberg. 2016. "Reform Interrupted? State Innovation, Court Decisions, and the Past and Future of Campaign Finance Reform in the States." *Election Law Journal* 15:2 (June): 143-159.

Sarah Birch and Carolien Ham. 2017. "Getting Away With Foul Play? The Importance of Formal and Informal Oversight Institutions for Electoral Integrity." *European Journal of Political Research* 56:3 (August): 487-511.

Accountability Institutions, the Judiciary, and Criminal Law (Wednesday, May 16)

Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, chs. 6 & 12.

Monika Bauhr and Nicholas Charron. 2018. "Insider or Outsider? Grand Corruption and Electoral Accountability." *Comparative Political Studies* 51:4 (March): 415-446.

International Responses to Corruption (Monday, May 21)

Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, chs 14-15.

William Vlcek. 2011. "Global Anti-Money Laundering Standards and Developing Economies: The Regulation of Mobile Money." *Development Policy Review* 29:4: 415-431.

NO CLASS – LASA in Barcelona (Wednesday, May 23)

Student Research Presentations (**Monday, May 28 & Wednesday, May 30 + an evening make-up session TBD)**

5 p.m. Final Paper Due (Monday, June 4)